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Karen Davis
Germantown, Maryland

What makes other animals truly meaningful to us 1
What must they be able to do, what traits or
potentialities must they show, to gain serious
attention: Is sentience enough? Will demonstrated
emotions suffice? Or do we demand that, in addition,
they display cognitive skills, including an ability to
"learn our language" - preferably, one of the
formalized symbolic languages scientists use to test
them?
Living in a culture obsessively focused, as ours is,
on rationalistic modes of perception and
communication may make it hard, if not impossible,
to resist assessing other creatures' worth according to
their SCientifically proclaimed ability to
"intellectualize," to think abstractly. Without being
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The Otherness

imposed, but who seems to want to transcend his
chimpanzee nature, to fly like a bird or better yet fly
a plane. At such moments the empathic flow levels
out to just another space trip, another ego trip.

fully aware we may anxiously scan our companion
animals for signs of cognition, consciously or
subconsciously disturbed over whether our cat or dog
is "really smart," and not merely acting by "instinct."
For, have we not heard that pigs are smarter than
dogs? Some say that cetaceans are smarter than
humans. Chimpanzees, reputedly our closest
nonhuman relatives, have shown definite signs of
thinking the way we do; automatically their value
appreciates. The proof comes when authority figures,
like Carl Sagan, start raising questions. Impressed by
the chimpanzee's ability to use Ameslan (American
sign language) and to invent strategies for outwitting
chickens, Sagan asks: "If chimpanzees have
consciousness, if they are capable of abstractions, do
they not have what until now has been described as
'human rights'?" (Carl Sagan, ''lbe Abstractions of
Beasts," from The Dragons of Eden: Speculations on
the Evolution of Human Intelligence).

Ecologists have criticized the animal rights
community for extending the boundaries of ethical
concern only as far as the human ego is willing to
travel. Some of us draw the line at oysters,
others... Well, beyond whatever line we draw lies an
enormous wasteland of foregone conclusions.
"Intellectualizing" the wasteland is one solution.
Making it over into Fantasyland, into Frontierland,
is another. Animal people need to be on the lookout
- the Disneyfication of the Desert syndrome should
signal to us a warning. Anxious not to alienate
others from our cause, half doubtful of our own
minds at times in a world which views other animals
so much differently than we do, we are liable to find
ourselves presenting them apologetically at Court,
spiffed up to seem more human, capable, ladies and
gentlemen, of performing Ameslan in six
languages...

Concerning Ameslan, it should be borne in mind
that the chimpanzee's ability to exercise this
language depends on an anatomical feature that
resembles one of ours - manual dexterity. Thus, no
matter how unique or intelligent, or how willing, any
creature having paws, fins, hoofs, or claws cannot
learn to use (even if capable of understanding)
Ameslan. Similarly, chimpanzees, though not
"dumb," appear to be physiologically and
anatomically ill-adapted to using (however
competent of understanding) verbal language, which
is why researchers switched to Ameslan. What
happens, though, to animals who for one reason or
other cannot, or will not, communicate in our terms?
Whose kind of intelligence is not our kind? Whose
modes of experience elude us? Must the "illiterate"
animal forgo "human rights"?

For whatever reasons we may be tempted to do
this, the fact remains: other animals, regardless of
how close to us, are not humanoids. They are not
phylogenetic fetuses that await our stimulating
contact to develop their evolutionary potential, any
more than they are failed humans, a kind of vast
inferno population whose only hope is genetic
redemption through our engineers. To cast them in
either of these make-believe roles, to approach them
as foregone conclusions, is to miss seeing them, and
in doing so, to create blindedness in ourselves and in
others.
To avoid contributing to the very attitudes
towards other living beings that we seek to change,
we have to raise fundamental questions about the
way that we, the defenders of animals, actually
conceive of them. What must a creature do in order
to secure the affection, the compassion, the justice
and protection that we humans crave for ourselves?
Are we willing to allow other living beings the right
to travel on their road, even when it branches off
from ours? Is not our willingness to do this what
animal liberation, for them and for us, is all about?

The problem of speciesism crops up. The film
Project X offers a case in point. While stressing the
chimpanzee's ability to learn Ameslan, it also asks
viewers to pay attention to the wealth of nonverbal
communication and expressiveness in human as well
as nonhuman animals. A bond of fellowship, even of
friendship, might be forged here. But the film's
reliance on humanosemblance to help carry this
message across could have a contrary effect.
Audiences are apt to be narcissistically gratified, and
relieved of guilt, at seeing a chimp who not only
implements a language that we have invented and
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